Bernard Williams is a sceptic about the objectivity of moral value, embracing instead a qualified moral relativism—the ‘relativism of distance’. His attitude to blame too is in part sceptical. I will argue that the relativism of distance is unconvincing, even incoherent; but also that it is detachable from the rest of Williams's moral philosophy. I will then go on to propose an entirely localized thesis I call the relativism of blame, which says that when an agent's moral shortcomings by our (...) lights are a matter of their living according to the moral thinking of their day, judgements of blame are out of order. Finally, I will propose a form of moral judgement we may sometimes quite properly direct towards historically distant agents when blame is inappropriate—moral-epistemic disappointment. Together these two proposals may help release us from the grip of the idea that moral appraisal always involves the potential applicability of blame, and so from a key source of the relativist idea that moral appraisal is inappropriate over distance. (shrink)

Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.

Reinvigorates our understanding of Victorian and modernist works and society Offers a wide-ranging application of theories of distributed cognition to Victorian culture and Modernism Explores the distinctive nature and expression of notions of distributed cognition in Victorian culture and Modernism and considers their relation to current notions Reinvigorates our understanding of Western European works – including Wordsworth, T. S. Eliot and Virginia Woolf – and society by bringing to bear recent insights on the distributed nature of cognition Includes essays by (...) international specialists in Victorian culture and Modernist literature, history, technology, science, philosophy and art including Andrew Michael Roberts, Jennifer Gosetti-Ferencei and Melba Cuddy-Keane Includes essays on literature, history, technology, science, philosophy and art This book brings together 11 essays by international specialists in Victorian culture and modernism and provides a general and period-specific introduction to distributed cognition and the cognitive humanities. Together, they revitalise our reading of Victorian and modernist works in the fields of history of technology, science and medicine, material culture, philosophy, art and literary studies by bringing to bear recent insights in cognitive science and philosophy of mind on the ways in which cognition is distributed across brain, body and world. (shrink)

Our understanding of social experiences is central to our social understanding more generally. But this sphere of epistemic practice can be structurally prejudiced by unequal relations of power, so that some groups suffer a distinctive kind of epistemic injustice—hermeneutical injustice. I aim to achieve a clear conception of this epistemicethical phenomenon, so that we have a workable definition and a proper understanding of the wrong that it inflicts.

This paper explores the relation between rational authority and social power, proceeding by way of a philosophical genealogy derived from Edward Craig's Knowledge and the State of Nature. The position advocated avoids the errors both of the 'traditionalist' (who regards the socio-political as irrelevant to epistemology) and of the 'reductivist' (who regards reason as just another form of social power). The argument is that a norm of credibility governs epistemic practice in the state of nature, which, when socially manifested, is (...) likely to imitate the structures of social power. A phenomenon of epistemic injustice is explained, and the politicizing implication for epistemology educed. (shrink)

When we hope to explain and perhaps vindicate a practice that is internally diverse, philosophy faces a methodological challenge. Such subject matters are likely to have explanatorily basic features that are not necessary conditions. This prompts a move away from analysis to some other kind of philosophical explanation. This paper proposes a paradigm based explanation of one such subject matter: blame. First, a paradigm form of blame is identified—‘Communicative Blame’—where this is understood as a candidate for an explanatorily basic form (...) of blame. Second, its point and purpose in our lives is investigated and found to reside in its power to increase the alignment of the blamer and the wrongdoer's moral understandings. Third, the hypothesis that Communicative Blame is an explanatorily basic form of blame is tested out by seeing how far other kinds of blame can reasonably be understood as derivative, especially in respect of blame's point and purpose. Finally, a new and quasi-political worry about blame is raised. (shrink)

We gain information from collective, often institutional bodies all the time—from the publications of committees, news teams, or research groups, from web sites such as Wikipedia, and so on—but do these bodies ever function as genuine group testifiers as opposed to mere group sources of information? In putting the question this way I invoke a distinction made, if briefly, by Edward Craig, which I believe to be of deep significance in thinking about the distinctiveness of the speech act of testimony. (...) The distinction is that between somebody’s functioning as a ‘good informant’ and their functioning merely as a ‘source of information’. The difference between these has, as he remarks, a crucial ethical aspect: What I have in mind is the special flavour of situations in which human beings treat each other as subjects with a common purpose, rather than as objects from which services, in this case true belief, can be extracted. In this paper I shall try to bring out the distinctive nature of the role of good informant in a way that helps to clarify what is at stake in asking whether there can be group testimony in the sense of genuinely collective testimony—that is to say, where the group testifier is a collective and not merely a sum of individuals testifying in one or another form of aggregated chorus. (shrink)

The thirteen specially-commissioned essays in this volume are written by philosophers at the forefront of feminist scholarship, and are designed to provide an accessible and stimulating guide to a philosophical literature that has seen massive expansion in recent years. Ranging from history of philosophy through metaphysics to philosophy of science, they encompass all the core subject areas commonly taught in anglophone undergraduate and graduate philosophy courses, offering both an overview of and a contribution to the relevant debates. Together they testify (...) to the intellectual value of feminism as a radicalizing energy internal to philosophical inquiry. This volume will be essential reading for any student or teacher of philosophy who is curious about the place of feminism in their subject. (shrink)

In this paper I respond to three commentaries on Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. In response to Alcoff, I primarily defend my conception of how an individual hearer might develop virtues of epistemic justice. I do this partly by drawing on empirical social psychological evidence supporting the possibility of reflective self-regulation for prejudice in our judgements. I also emphasize the fact that individual virtue is only part of the solution – structural mechanisms also have an essential role (...) in combating epistemic injustice. My response to Goldberg principally concerns my perceptual account of the epistemology of testimony, which I defend as being both well-motivated and best categorized as a species of non-inferentialism. I also explain its relation to the reductionism/non-reductionism contrast, and defend my resistance to casting it as any kind of default view. In response to Hookway, I contrast discriminatory with distributive forms of epistemic injustice, and defend the basic taxonomy I present in the book, which casts testimonial and hermeneutical injustice as the two fundamental discriminatory forms of epistemic injustice. (shrink)

I shall first briefly revisit the broad idea of ‘epistemic injustice’, explaining how it can take either distributive or discriminatory form, in order to put the concepts of ‘testimonial injustice’ and ‘hermeneutical injustice’ in place. In previous work I have explored how the wrong of both kinds of epistemic injustice has both an ethical and an epistemic significance—someone is wronged in their capacity as a knower. But my present aim is to show that this wrong can also have a political (...) significance in relation to non-domination, and so to freedom. While it is only the republican conception of political freedom that presents nondomination as constitutive of freedom, I shall argue that non-domination is best understood as a thoroughly generic liberal ideal of freedom to which even negative libertarians are implicitly committed, for non-domination is negative liberty as of right—secured non-interference. Crucially on this conception, non-domination requires that the citizen can contest interferences. Pettit specifies three conditions of contestation, each of which protects against a salient risk of the would-be contester not getting a ‘proper hearing’. But I shall argue that missing from this list is anything to protect against a fourth salient threat: the threat that either kind of epistemic injustice might disable contestation by way of an unjust deflation of either credibility or intelligibility. Thus we see that both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice can render a would-be contester dominated. Epistemic justice is thereby revealed as a constitutive condition of non-domination, and thus of a central liberal political ideal of freedom. (shrink)

[T]he dominated live in a world structured by others for their purposes — purposes that at the very least are not our own and that are in various degrees inimical to our development and even existence.We are perhaps used to the idea that there are various species of oppression: political, economic, or sexual, for instance. But where there is the phenomenon that Nancy Hartsock picks out in saying that the world is “structured” by the powerful to the detriment of the (...) powerless, there is another species of oppression at work, one that has not been registered in mainstream epistemology: epistemic oppression. The word ‘structured’ may be read materially, so as to imply that social institutions and practices favour the powerful, or ontologically, so as to imply that the powerful somehow constitute the world. But for present purposes I am interested only in an epistemological reading, which implies that the powerful have some sort of unfair advantage in “structuring” our understandings of the social world. I will try to present an account of what this initially vague idea involves. I hope thereby to explain an exact sense in which the powerful can have a kind of epistemic advantage that means the powerless are epistemically oppressed. (shrink)

Interpreting Bernard Williams’s ethical philosophy is not easy. His style is deceptively conversational; apparently direct, yet argumentatively inexplicit and allusive. He is moreover committed to evading ready-made philosophical “-isms.” All this reinforces the already distinct impression that the structure of his philosophy is a web of interrelated commitments where none has unique priority. Against this impression, however, I will venture that the contours of his philosophy become clearest if one considers that there is a single, unchanging root conviction from which (...) his ethical philosophy grows. Despite the perpetual motion of his philosophical thought—its erudition, originality, range, and unceasing forward momentum—still, I contend, there is something unchanging at the heart of it. I will show this by reference to three signature theses: internal reasons, the relativism of distance, and the porous borders of philosophy and history. I will argue that the root conviction of which these are the fruits is the conviction that the constraints of universal rationality seriously underdetermine how one should live. This, I believe, is the vision of the human ethical condition that constitutes the largely inexplicit yet utterly fundamental presupposition beneath Williams’s ethical philosophy taken as a whole. I label the object of this root conviction ethical freedom, and thus portray Williams as a philosopher of ethical freedom. (shrink)

Moral intensity theory is used to explain how characteristics of moral issues affect ethical decision-making. According to moral intensity theory, individuals and firms will make more ethical decisions when moral intensity is present, such as greater negative consequences, including harm to customers. However, evidence suggests this does not always happen in crisis situations. For example, Fisher Price waited until 30 babies died before recalling its Rock’n Play Sleeper in 2019. In this article, the concept of immoral entrenchment is introduced to (...) address how crises affect the expected firm responses to morally intense ethical issues. Immoral entrenchment suggests that firms experience threat-rigidity responses to crises that lead to collective moral disengagement. Immoral entrenchment results in firms’ denial of responsibility and unethical behavior, instead of ethical behavior, in the face of highly negative consequences. The study in this article tests immoral entrenchment in the context of the speed to recall 843 consumer products. Supplemental qualitative evidence illustrates the collective moral disengagement dimension of immoral entrenchment. Contributing to the literature on ethics and crisis, the findings demonstrate that crises can generate immoral entrenchment in firms, which reverses the expected ethical response of those firms to issues with high moral intensity. (shrink)

Este texto es la traducción del capítulo cuarto de The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, editado por Ian James Kidd, José Medina y Gaile Pohlhaus Jr. En él, Miranda Fricker aclara y delimita los conceptos de injusticia hermenéutica y testimonial, proporcionando ejemplos, narrando su genealogía, respondiendo a algunas de las críticas que recibieron estos conceptos, así como estableciendo relaciones de semejanza y contraste con otras concepciones de la justicia y otras ramas de la filosofía.

The dual aim of this article is to reveal and explain a certain phenomenon of epistemic injustice as manifested in testimonial practice, and to arrive at a characterisation of the anti–prejudicial intellectual virtue that is such as to counteract it. This sort of injustice occurs when prejudice on the part of the hearer leads to the speaker receiving less credibility than he or she deserves. It is suggested that where this phenomenon is systematic it constitutes an important form of oppression. (...) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]. (shrink)

The concept of ‘the Canadian identity’ is a topic which has received much attention in recent decades, stimulating discussions on the topic of what makes a Canadian a Canadian? Today, being Canadian might suggest a love of hockey and poutine. However, a century ago, being “Canadian” was an emphasis on adapting or conforming to British norms. This paper will focus on one important theme in debates around ‘Canadianization’, specifically its reflection over time in the domestic structure of the early Ukrainian (...) settlers. Canadian identity studies can especially benefit from this trace of identity formation, by its application to a broader, multi-ethnical context. (shrink)

Esta lectura propone abordar lo que hemos denominado espacio sagrado, entendiéndolo como la representación literaria de las creencias religiosas y sus manifestaciones rituales presentes en las obras Cherrufe de Ruth Fuentealba Millaguir y Um defeito de cor [2006] de Ana Maria Gonçalves. Planteamos que este espacio hace emerger dentro de la narrativa afrobrasileña y mapuche una sujeto femenina que en su relación con el sistema simbólico de su comunidad entreteje las marcas de género, raza y sexualidad en la constitución subjetiva. (...) Afirmamos también que mediante el vínculo entre la mujeres y lo sagrado la subjetividad que emerge en las obras analizadas se presenta como presevadora y reproductora de la cultura y sus saberes más preciados, imprescindibles para la supervivencia individual y colectiva de sus pueblos. (shrink)

Resumen: En el siguiente análisis intentamos, por una parte, contextualizar la loa El divino Narciso de sor Juana Inés de Cruz dentro de los paradigmas estéticos y culturales de su época. Y por otra, reactualizar la lectura crítica de ella desde la perspectiva de una retórica o poética subalterna, entendiendo esto último como la deconstrucción literaria y su posterior reorganización de las significaciones que justificaron el colonialismo. Lo anterior tiene por finalidad dar cuenta cómo, mediante la manipulación precisa de los (...) códigos hegemónicos, se logra invertir los contenidos simbólicos de una de las representaciones más tempranas y persistentes del continente americano: la figura América-mujer, imagen que naturalizó y justificó su alteridad.: In the following analysis, we tried first to contextualize La loa El Divino Narciso from Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz within esthetical and cultural paradigms of her time. Then, we tried to update her critical reading from the perspective of a subordinate rhetoric or poetics. We understand it as the literary deconstruction and subsequent reorganization of the meanings that justified colonialism. This approach has the purpose of accounting for the way in which accurate manipulation of hegemonic codes makes it possible to reverse the symbolic contents of one of the earliest and most persistent representations of the American continent: the America-woman figure. This image naturalized and justified its otherness. (shrink)

This paper analyzes some relevant aspects of the Incarnation of Jesus, the God-Son. It considers the tension between interpretations in favor of a metaphorical reading, and the problem that entails that this discards the historical character, the event of God made flesh. This is an ontological problem. At the same time, reflects on the role of the notion of mystery and the scope it has to believing in the Incarnation, that is, admitting an inherent epistemic limit as finite beings but (...) at the same time making viable that the believer gradually understands what he believes, even if not fully. This constitutes an epistemic edge. In the same way, the role of language as a way of access and transmission of knowledge about the divine and sacred is evaluated, emphasizing the role of the names used to refer to the God-Father, the God-Son and the Holy Spirit, considering their logical implications. (shrink)

The poetic … would be that which you desire to learn, but from and of the other, thanks to the other and under dictation, by heart. Derrida, “Che cos’è la Poesia?” 227 I dare not pretend to be any...

The poetic … would be that which you desire to learn, but from and of the other, thanks to the other and under dictation, by heart. Derrida, “Che cos’è la Poesia?” 227 I dare not pretend to be any...

There are two kinds of forgiveness that appear as radically different from one another: one presents forgiveness as essentially earned through remorseful apology; the other presents it as fundamentally non-earned—a gift. The first, which I label Moral Justice Forgiveness, adopts a stance of moral demand and conditionality; the second, which I label Gifted Forgiveness, adopts a stance of non-demand and un-conditionality. Each is real; yet how can two such different responses to wrongdoing be of one and the same kind? This (...) paper explains how, by showing that the basic role each plays in moral-social life is the same; and that one is conceptually and therefore historically prior to the other. The result is pluralism, with each kind of forgiveness represented as distinctive in both its psychology and its normativity; and yet an ordered pluralism—with Moral Justice Forgiveness revealed as the root kind, and Gifted Forgiveness a culturally contingent iteration. (shrink)

Reveals the diverse ways that cognition was seen as spread over brain, body and world in the 9–17th centuries - The second book in an ambitious 4-volume set looking at distributed cognition in the history of thought - Includes essays on literature, philosophy, law, art, music, medicine, science and material culture - For students and scholars in medieval and Renaissance studies, cognitive humanities and philosophy of mind - Draws out what was distinctive about medieval and Renaissance insights into (and superstitions (...) about) the cognitive roles of the body and environment - Examines how humanities topics are affected by new insights from the cognitive sciences This collection explores how medieval and Renaissance practices and ideas reveal the expression (and suppression) of cognition as distributed across brain, body and world. As many of the texts and practices have influenced later Western European societies and cultures, this book reveals vital stages in the historical development of our attempts to comprehend and optimise the distributed nature of cognition. (shrink)

I intend to show some of the limits of the decision-theoretic model in connection with the analysis of cognitive agency. Although the concept of maximum expected utility can be helpful for explaining the decision-making process, it is certainly not the primary motor that moves agents to action. Moreover, it has been noticed elsewhere that this model is inadequate to the analysis of single cases of practical reasoning. A theory is proposed that introduces a plan-structure as a basic idea. In order (...) to know its very conceptual scope, we need to accommodate that theory to a cognitive architecture whereby the rational and autonomous agent makes choices and deliberates between courses of action to achieve specific goals that are of its interest. The paper endeavours also to clarify the relationship between the different modules that should constitute the architecture of an agent to accomplish the requisites of efficiency and autonomy in a changeable and dynamic world. (shrink)

In spite of the presence of women in previously male-dominated ecclesial spaces, patriarchal normativity continues to be re-inscribed through the reproduction of knowledge, which sustains skewed gender power relations amongst the clergy. This was a case in point when a newly ordained woman priest in the Anglican Church of Southern Africa was recently addressed as, and given the official title, ‘mother’ during the vestment ritual at a church service where she was to celebrate the Eucharist for the first time. This (...) while the male priests present had retained the title ‘father’ without any critical reflection on the male-headship theology it perpetuates. If one considers that the ordination of women has opened the possibility for them to celebrate the Eucharist, which gives authority to preside at the ‘Table’, then one has to be mindful of the subtle ways in which language is used to regulate the production and reproduction of gender bias in a patriarchal system. Being the guest preacher at the celebratory service of this former Ethics and Theology student, I could do no other but interrupt the sermon I had prepared. In this article, I argue that interruption is a helpful theoretical concept – both as a transformative rhetorical strategy in the interpretation of biblical texts and also as an act of resisting discourses and practices that uphold and re-inscribe patriarchal norms. I will approach the hermeneutical concept of interruption from what I call a feminist theo-ethical perspective. (shrink)

The Iraq tribunal is an odd creature. It is an Iraqi-led mechanism designed and supported by foreigners. It is based on international law but relies heavily on Iraqi legal tradition and procedures. And it is a postconflict initiative in the midst of escalating war.

There is a need for person-centred approaches and empowerment of staff within the residential care for older people; a movement called ‘culture change’. There is however no single path for achieving culture change. With the aim of increasing understandings about cultural change processes and the promotion of cultural values and norms associated with person-centred practices, this article presents an action research project set on a unit in the Netherlands providing care for older people with dementia. The project is presented as (...) a case study. This study examines what has contributed to the improvement of participation of older people with dementia in daily occupational and leisure activities according to practitioners. Data was collected by participant observation, interviews and focus groups. The results show that simultaneous to the improvement of the older people’s involvement in daily activities a cultural transformation took place and that the care became more person-centred. Spontaneous interactions and responses rather than planned interventions, analysis and reflection contributed to this. Furthermore, it proved to be beneficial that the process of change and the facilitation of that process reflected the same values as those underlying the cultural change. It is concluded that changes arise from dynamic, interactive and non-linear processes which are complex in nature and difficult to predict and to control. Nevertheless, managers and facilitators can facilitate such change by generating movement through the introduction of small focused projects that meet the stakeholders’ needs, by creating conditions for interaction and sense making, and by promoting the new desired cultural values. (shrink)

Background There has been considerable investment and strategic planning to introduce genomic testing into Australia’s public health system. As more patients’ genomic data is being held by the public health system, there will be increased requests from researchers to access this data. It is important that public policy reflects public expectations for how genomic data that is generated from clinical tests is used. To inform public policy and discussions around genomic data sharing, we sought public opinions on using genomic data (...) contained in medical records for research purposes in the Australian state of Queensland. Methods A total of 1494 participants completed an online questionnaire between February and May 2019. Participants were adults living in Australia. The questionnaire explored participant preferences for sharing genomic data or biological samples with researchers, and concerns about genomic data sharing. Results Most participants wanted to be given the choice to have their genomic data from medical records used in research. Their expectations on whether and how often they needed to be approached for permission on using their genomic data, depended on whether the data was identifiable or anonymous. Their willingness to sharing data for research purposes depended on the type of information being shared, what type of research would be undertaken and who would be doing the research. Participants were most concerned with genomics data sharing that could lead to discrimination, data being used for marketing, data security, or commercial use. Conclusions Most participants were willing to share their genomic data from medical records with researchers, as long as permission for use was sought. However, the existing policies related to this process in Queensland do not reflect participant expectations for how this is achieved, particularly with anonymous genomics data. This inconsistency may be addressed by process changes, such as inclusion of research in addition to clinical consent or general research data consent programs. (shrink)

Este artículo presenta argumentos a favor del diseño de políticas públicas sensibles al desafío multicultural y, en especial, a la circunstancia de que la cultura es un elemento crucial para la identidad individual. En primer lugar, repasa la querella entre liberales y comunitaristas como la fuente del actual debate. Luego, analiza la reacción de Rawls ante la crítica comunitarista. En tercer lugar, expone críticamente las tres grandes concepciones-modelo que intentan hacerse cargo del pluralismo cultural. Y, para finalizar, esboza una posible (...) respuesta a las demandas de las minorías étnicas. (shrink)

Se busca rastrear la imagen que Platón tiene de Heráclito y articularla con la estructura argumentativa del Cratilo, para comprender las necesidades textuales a las que responde la doctrina del flujo perpetuo, es decir, la discusión sobre la corrección (ὀρθότης) del nombre. Gracias a la inclusión del testimonio heraclíteo, resulta posible rastrear la presunta consolidación de la tesis sobre los nombres primarios y los secundarios como el eje de la separación entre dos planos de realidad (uno estable y uno móvil) (...) y de la teoría de las Ideas -es decir, como la base de la epistemología platónica presente en los diálogos de madurez-. The article seeks to trace the image Plato has of Heraclitus and connect it with the argumentative structure of the Cratylus in order to understand the textual needs that give rise to the doctrine of perpetual flux, that is, the discussion regarding the correctness (ὀρθότης) of names. The inclusion of Heraclitus's testimony makes it possible to trace the alleged consolidation of the thesis regarding primary and secondary names as the axis of separation between two levels of reality (one stable, the other, changing) and the theory of Ideas -that is, as the basis of Plato's epistemology as set forth in the late dialogues-. (shrink)

Insight into animal biology and development provided by classical genetic analysis of the model organism Drosophila melanogaster was an incentive to develop advanced genetic tools for this insect. But genetic systems for the over one million other known insect species are largely undeveloped. With increasing information about insect genomes resulting from next generation sequencing, RNA interference is now the method of choice for reverse genetics, although it is constrained by the means of delivery of interfering RNA. A recent advance to (...) ensure sustained delivery with minimal experimental intervention or trauma to the insect is to exploit commensal bacteria for symbiont‐mediated RNA interference. This technology not only offers an efficient means for RNA interference in insects in laboratory conditions, but also has potential for use in the control of human disease vectors, agricultural pests and pathogens of beneficial insects. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the different styles of moral relativism. The history of moral relativist thinking features different branches to the family tree, each representing a different impetus to relativism, and so producing a different style of moral relativist thought. At the root, however, is a broadly subjectivist parent idea that morality is at least in part the upshot of a shared way of life, and shared ways of life tend to vary markedly from culture to culture. The discussions cover (...) the branches of moral historicism, moral reasons, moral truth, and moral plurality. (shrink)

She was to a degree the tool of her husband. However, despite the fact she was under his influence to a degree she cannot escape if the Bank took all reasonable steps to ensure that she had appreciated and understood what she was signing. It may be that Mrs Wright-Bailey did not have an adequate comprehension of the nature of the charge... [E]ven if she did not, the Bank did take all reasonable steps.